Election
Monitoring:
Observing and Reconciling Election Counts
California
September 29, 2006
Version 1.0
SCOPE: This document describes what to look for when monitoring machines and processes involved in the counting of the voting. It does NOT cover civil rights monitoring such as registration, intimidation, and dirty tricks.
Michelle Gabriel
Election Integrity Advocate
OBSERVING PREPARATION AND OPERATION OF TABULATING DEVICES, PROGRAMMING, AND TESTING
OBSERVING LOGIC AND ACCURACY TESTING
OBSERVING ABSENTEE BALLOT PROCESSING
INCIDENTS TO DOCUMENT FOR ELECTION INCIDENT REPORTS (EIRS)
ELECTION MONITORING TEAM SUMMARY
1. Preparation of operation of tabulating devices, programming and testing
2. Logic and Accuracy Testing
3. Absentee Ballot processing that happens prior to the election
4. Pollworker training
1. Poll opening/set up procedures
2. The polls as either a pollworker or a pollwatcher
3. Poll closing procedures
1. Chain of custody of ballots and memory cards
2. Counting of the Votes
3. 1% Manual Audit
Preparation of operation of tabulating devices, programming and testing
Logic and Accuracy Testing
Note – this should be open to the public, space permitting.
1. Pollworker training
2. Poll opening procedures
3. Poll operations
4. Poll closing procedures
Poll operations inside the polling place
Note: In California there is no difference between pollwatchers and the general public. In other states, each party specifies pollwatchers.
1. Absentee Ballot processing before, during and after the election
2. Chain of custody of ballots and memory cards
3. Counting of the vote
4. 1% manual tally
5. Provisional Ballot processing
1. Number of registered voters per county vs. number of voters total
2. Number of registered voters per precinct vs. number of voters
3. Results posted at polling site vs. published numbers per precinct
NOTE: There is a tendency amongst RoVs to not post these results or just post for the precinct based optiscans, not the DREs. This is an election code violation that the Secretary of State is allowing.
4. Summation of results posted at polling site vs. summation of individual memory cards
5. Summation of individual memory card results vs. central tabulator results
6. Anomalies in number of spoiled/redone votes on VVPAT machines, per machine
7. Anomalies in number of spoiled/redone votes on VVPAT machines, per precinct
8. Anomalies in spread of precincts chosen for 1% manual tally
9. 1% manual tally sheet errors
10. 1% manual tally sheet vs. precinct results sheet vs. published precinct results sheet
1. Why am I observing? You have the right, but why are you exercising it?
Which apply to you? What are you doing to meet your goal?
1. I want to make sure the count is accurate.
2. I want to catch the staff making a mistake so I can nail them.
3. I want the bad guys to know there are observers so they won’t try anything.
4. I want to make sure the laws are followed.
5. To collect evidence
NOTE: #2 may get you into trouble for future interactions.
2. What are the systems you are observing?
Check your county website for information on what systems are being used.
Read about them at http://verifiedvoting.org/article.php?list=type&type=63 - they are in process of updating info.
1. For a standard poll vote – i.e. precinct based optiscan, DRE
2. For handicapped accessibility – i.e. touchscreen –DRE or ballot marking device
3. Centralized ballot counting - high-speed optiscan for absentee ballots
4. Tabulators
3. What state election codes cover what you are observing?
See key election codes in this document. There is very little in the code about the details of observing.
http://www.election-reform.org/laws/Calif.html
4. Who is the RoV/clerk/ etc of this county and how can I contact this person?
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/elections_d.htm
This site is not very up to date, but you can get a phone number to call and confirm any contact info you need.
5. Who am I observing for?
Verified Voting is setting up a registration for observers so there is a central gathering place for information. From their site:
Interested
in learning more about election transparency and how you can help?
Send an email to observer@verifiedvoting.org
to receive more information.
You gather more flies with honey than with vinegar. If you are part of an election protection group, such as for a specific candidate, you should visit your RoV well before the election to discuss what you will need and what they will allow. This prevents surprises and an adversarial relationship on election night, when everyone is already under intense pressure.
Here is a list of items to go over with your election official:
1. What are the physical boundaries at the polls? At the central count facility? Can I take pictures? Can I record audio? Video?
2. How is the vote counted in this county?
Some counties, such as San Francisco, publish observation guides, but you may have to track this yourself. Ask for a tour of the facilities including absentee ballot processing, warehousing, consolidation points, and central counting.
3. What county procedures cover the election process?
Ask for a copy of their procedures manual for their employees and of their election plan that must be submitted to the Secretary of State 29 days prior to the election. (10/10/06). See EC 15003 on page 43 of this document. A plan not submitted is an Election Code violation.
4. Ask for the county to post the results/statement of vote in a machine-readable format, such as .csv. Commonly used .pdf files can NOT be put into Excel and have analysis performed. The statement of vote needs to be broken down by precinct, polling place vote, absentee vote, provisional vote, etc.
5. Ask for the county post the results on the web from each of the memory cards in a machine-readable format. This is for reconcile.
6. When will information on registration numbers by precinct be available and can it be posted on the web in machine-readable format?
7. For the 1% manual tally, will the choice of random precincts be done after the close of polls, in a public and transparent manner? Will the date be announced in advance?
8. What are the procedures for handling a discrepancy in the 1% manual tally? Ask that all discrepancies and their resolution be publicly reported prior to election certification.
Ask for any policies or procedures that are available.
9. Would the RoV consider doing a high percentage for audit, such as 5%? If not for all races, then for close races? Will the 1% audit cover all votes, including absentee and provisional ballots?
10. Will the RoV keep track of the number of spoiled votes by precinct on the DRE VVPAT rolls and publish these numbers?
1. A good philosophy to keep in mind during any observing you do is:
1. Write it down
2. Keep observing notes separate from criticism and analysis.
3. Include everything in your notes so that others can form their own opinions.
4. Get the information out into the public
2. Bring with you: Pencil, Paper, Notebook, EIRS form (TBD), Video camera, Digital camera, Cell phone, Laptop, Watch, Binoculars, Phone numbers for local news reporters
3. How much time can I spend?
According to BBV, the most interesting problems happen from 10 p.m. to 1 a.m. on Election Day. Whatever time you plan on covering, have a backup or someone to handover the observing to when you leave. Teamwork is critical.
4. What am I going to do with all my observing notes?
Write a report of your observations and submit this report to.
a) County: RoV, Board of Supervisors, Elections Board
b) State: Secretary of State, state legislators
c) Political: Candidates, county central committee of both parties
d) CA State library, which will keep it as a public record
e) Interested press contacts
f) Various watchdog groups
BlackBoxVoting.org section on California elections
http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/132/8533.html?1151439266
Verified Voting
http://www.verifiedvoting.org/index.php
OBSERVING PREPARATION AND OPERATION OF TABULATING DEVICES, PROGRAMMING, AND TESTING
15004. The county central committee of each qualified political party may employ, and may have present at the central counting place or places, not more than two qualified data processing specialists or engineers to check and review the preparation and operation of the tabulating devices, their programming and testing, and have the specialists or engineers in attendance at any or all phases of the election.
This is something left to the experts, not the general public, to accomplish. What to look for won’t be covered in detail here, as this author is not an expert. However, this section is here so that groups interested in monitoring may know that this part of the code exists and try to hire experts or recruit volunteers to perform this duty. Groups to recruit from include BlackBoxVoting.org and ACCURATE.
For Diebold AV-TSx and AV-OS machines, the Secretary of State gave them a conditional certification, which lists security measures that must be followed by RoVs. These are good practices for all the vendors’ machines.
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/diebold_cert.pdf
o The elections official must reset the encryption key used for all AV-TSX units to change the key from the factory default setting prior to programming any units.
o Each memory card must be programmed in a secured facility under the supervision of the registrar of voters/registrar of voters’ staff. Once a memory card is programmed for the election, it must be immediately inserted into its assigned unit and sealed with a serialized, tamper-evident seal by the registrar of voters or the registrar’s staff, and have its serial number logged into a tracking sheet designed for that purpose.
o The county must maintain a written log that records which memory cards and which serialized tamper-evident seals are assigned to which units. Any breach of control over a memory card shall require that its contents be zeroed, in the presence of two election officials, before it can be used again
o The County must maintain a written log that accurately records the chain of custody of each memory card and unit from the point of programming the memory card for use in the election through the time of completion of the official canvass.
o Access to the GEMS server shall be tightly controlled and all persons having access to it at any time shall be pre-approved by the county elections official and noted in a log that details name, time, and purpose of access to the room in which the GEMS is housed.
OBSERVING LOGIC AND ACCURACY TESTING
State Election code 15004 allow the county central committee of each qualified political party to have present two specialists or engineers to be in attendance at any or all phase of the election.
Each county has different policies about who can observe and/or participate in this. In Alameda County, it is two members of the Grand Jury and two members of the League of Women Voters.
The Logic and Accuracy test is a functionality test and it does not truly cover all functions or simulate all the complexities of an election. It is useful for finding accidental errors, particularly accidental ballot layout/configuration/programming errors. It won’t find intentional fraud. Nevertheless, it is done and should catch some major flaws if they are present. Accidental errors are not uncommon.
The following has been taken mainly from BBV Toolkit.
o Obtain a list of each test that is done
o Find out when each testing session takes place
o Ask about requirements for attending
o Ask for written procedures for each type of testing
o Review user manuals of system to be tested
http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/2197/2994.html
Here are some of the things to document during testing:
o Find out if all machines that will be used in the election will be included in the testing. This includes the DRE’s, the precinct based opti-scans, and the high-speed central scanners. Some counties only test the polling place machines.
o Find out whether voting machines are placed in a "test mode." Ask if the machines are ever tested while in election mode.
o Ask whether the testers will be using the voting machines in the same way that voters would be on Election Day?
o On Election Day, DRE machines (touch-screens and roll-a-wheel systems) are sometimes networked together. Sometimes they are not networked, but daisy-chained together with a power cord. See if you can document differences between testing and election day.
o Will the testing involve humans pressing the touchscreen on the DREs or will it involve “macro”, “scripts” or automated logic and accuracy testing?
o Will the testing include large numbers of votes? Document how many actual votes are tested on each machine. If an automated script is used, document that as well. (Obviously, testing with an automated script does not replicate casting real votes.)
o Is testing done on every candidate and ballot question choice, or just a few of them? For locations with multiple languages on the ballot, are the foreign language ballots and audio ballots tested as well?
o Will the Logic & Accuracy testing include vote tally checking? (On Election Day, votes from each machine are later fed into a central tabulator machine. Does the testing replicate this step or omit it?) If it omits testing the central tabulator, find out if/when they will test that system and see if you can observe that as well.
o Will the testing include the use of an independent log comparing the system count with those selections made by the voter? Are testers allowed to choose any votes themselves, or is all testing done with a pre-set selection of votes?
o Ask that the testers make themselves available for questioning prior to and after each testing session (remember to videotape their answers to your questions).
Verified Voting will have an online survey document and web form for pre-election Logic and Accuracy testing. Anyone who wants to participate should sign up at:
http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/downloads/Pre-electionLAQ.pdf
See page 44 for relevant election codes.
OBSERVING ABSENTEE BALLOT PROCESSING
General public
State Election code 15004 allows the county central committee of each qualified political party to have present two specialists or engineers to be in attendance at any or all phase of the election.
Absentee ballots come into the RoV from many different routes and at different times:
o Mailed in
o Dropped off at the RoV’s
o Dropped off at the polling site
The general processing steps for absentee ballots in Alameda County, which is probably similar in most counties:
SIGNATURE VERIFICATION
1. Yellow absentee ballot envelopes are delivered to the RoV office.
2. Numbered trays packed with envelopes go to staffers at several scanning machines.
3. Envelopes enter the machine, the signature is scanned, and the envelope is stamped with a unique identifying number.
4. Envelopes return to the tray in numerical order.
5. Signature images are called up by staffers at a bank of computers.
6. A staffer pulls up an electronic image of the voter’s signature from the voter registration form.
7. The two signatures are compared and accepted or rejected.
8. If the signature is rejected, the voter is sent a new registration form to get a current signature.
ENVELOPE OPENING
1. Trays of envelopes with approved signatures are labeled.
2. Batches of envelopes are vibrated to shake down the ballot in the envelope.
3. Batches of envelopes are put in a slitting machine.
4. Staffer takes out the ballot, discards the envelope, and stacks ballots in a tray.
UNFOLDING AND SORTING
1. Clerks unfold the ballots, remove stubs if voter has not, and clean the edge.
2. Clerks sort ballots into 3 trays – good, damaged, and write in.
3. Filled good trays are smoothed, flattened, and stacked into batches of 50 and combined into trays of 500.
SORTING BY PRECINCT OR BALLOT TYPE
One important step NOT done in Alameda County, but that is done in other counties such as Santa Clara, is physically sorting the ballots by precinct. Although results are tabulated by precinct, the ballots are not sorted that way. If SB1235 is signed into law, which has not happened at the time of the writing of this manual, it will change this for future elections. It requires that absentee ballots be sorted by precinct and counted in the 1% manual audit. This will force the issue of sorting the ballots.
1. Does the county have a person look at every signature or is computerized signature verification used.
2. What is the process when a signature is rejected? How many were rejected and sent registration forms?
3. Is any record kept of what precincts have rejected ballots? Ask for machine-readable summaries of received, accepted, and rejected absentee ballots. This information should be broken down by precinct and by reason for rejection.
4. When does the counting of the absentee ballots begin? Is it totaled at any time prior to 8:00 pm election day? Who has access to those totals?
5. Are the piles of absentee ballots handled in a clear way that would not prevent trays of ballots from being misplaced or lost? Are there processes in place to perform a check and balance that the number of ballots received are all counted?
Verified Voting also suggests the following:
Monitors may be especially interested in observing the counting of absentee ballots, also typically conducted at the county election headquarters, and usually begun on Election Day. Finally, many jurisdictions now allow “early voting” sometimes called “early absentee” which is conducted in a limited number of locations within a county, parish or township. In many cases, counties use electronic voting machines for early voting even when they do not use them for Election Day. Early voting procedures therefore should also be monitored wherever possible.
Verified Voting will have an online survey document and web form for early voting end-of-day procedures. Anyone who wants to participate should sign up at
http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/downloads/EarlyVotingIntro-Instructions.pdf
See page 44 for relevant election codes.
In Alameda County, and probably most other counties, here are the criteria:
o Registered voters in Alameda County –or-
o Alameda County employees –or-
o High school seniors over 16 years of age in a school sponsored poll worker program
If you are going to be a pollworker, please sign up for the collaborative effort known as “Pollworkers for Democracy” at www.pollworkersfordemocracy.org. Included will be a conference call training and some materials to supplement what you learn at the county.
Other than pollworkers, call your RoV’s office and ask if you can attend.
The way to learn is to actually do a job. The best way to be involved in Election Integrity is to be a Pollworker. From that vantage point you get to…
o Experience the training and comment on it
o Experience the voting process
o Experience dealing with the machines
o Follow the chain of custody of the ballots
o Get to know your county elections staff and officials
o Gain credibility when speaking about elections issues
o Gain some empathy for pollworkers and county elections staff
For people who are knowledgeable, you are in a perfect position to document incidents.
It is recommended that you become an inspector – then you are the responsible for running the polling place, setting up the machines, and delivering the ballots at the end of the day. In other positions, you won’t get this full breadth of experience and knowledge.
At pollworker training, you may be given some materials on how to run the machines. This is excellent material to keep and post so that others can learn how to use the machines.
1. How much time is spent on the training in total?
2 How much time is spent on dealing with the machines?
3. What are you told to do if there is an incident with a machine? Is it in any of the written material you are given?
4. Were VVPATs explained? Did pollworkers understand their purpose?
5. What did the training say about checking/using security seals?
BBV suggests…
o At the training session, take notes on each piece of equipment you will be using.
o Ask questions about the chain of custody for each piece of apparatus and for portable devices like voter card encoders, electronic pollbooks, cartridges, memory cards and the like. Report "sleepovers" (equipment sent home with you or other workers) and take careful note of the instructions for handling the electronic ballot boxes (also called memory cards, PEBs, cartridges). Take pictures of the seals.
o Make notes of any trucking firms, transportation companies or third-party vendors who will be bringing you equipment or taking it away.
o Ask and make note of the specific procedures for any repairs or troubleshooting on the machines or the peripheral devices on Election Day.
o General public
o State Election code 15004 allow the county central committee of each qualified political party to have present two specialists or engineers to be in attendance at any or all phase of the election.
Secretary of State News Release KS04:078 of November 1, 2004 has the best information on what the state allows pollwatchers to do (see page 44 for full press release):
Observers at polling places during the day are not allowed to film voters coming or leaving the voting site and may not film inside the polling place while the polls are open. There are exceptions, however, allowing for news media crews with consent of the county elections official.
Observers can be inside polling places, however, and may observe the roster of voters, watch the polling place being set up or closed at the end of the day, and they may see voting procedures throughout the day. They may not interfere with the work of the elections staff, nor may they touch any voting materials, station themselves near where voters are casting ballots or depositing their voted ballots, sit at the election board’s table, or intimidate or impede the actions of board members or voters.
o Understand all security measures put in place by the RoV. Verify that all such security measures have been followed.
o Confirm that any physical security measure is in place and has NOT been tampered with prior to opening the polls/using the equipment. Confirm seals are unbroken, serial numbers match or confirm that pollworkers have checked this.
o Confirm that zero tapes are printed out.
o If there is a problem with any equipment, document RoV office actions.
o Understand all security measures to be taken by the inspector and the clerks.
o Verify that the security measures machines issued by the SoS for using AV-TSx and AV-OS are followed: http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/diebold_cert.pdf
These are good practices for all the vendors’ machines.
1. Each memory card shall have a permanent serial number assigned to it.
2. On Election Day, prior to any ballots being cast on any unit, the integrity of the tamper-evident seal must be verified by the precinct officer before opening the compartment containing the memory card and unit power switch. The serial number of the seal must also be verified against the log provided the Precinct Inspector. This procedure must be witnessed by at least one other precinct officer or staff of the registrar of voters.
3. If it is detected that the seal has been broken prior to the unlocking of the compartment, or if there is a discrepancy between the log and the serial number, the discrepancy must be confirmed by one or more of the remaining members of the precinct board, documented, and immediately reported to the county elections official for the jurisdiction. The elections official shall immediately investigate an determine appropriate action. If this potential breach occurs in unit, the specific unit must undergo a full manual reconciliation of the electronic votes cast and captured on the memory card against the paper audit record for that unit. If being used to meet the accessibility provisions of federal or state law, or if for any reason only one such unit is being used at the precinct, once one vote is cast on a TSX unit, the poll workers shall ensure that at least two more ballots are cast on the machine, even if not by a voter needing its accessibility components, in order to protect the privacy of the voter.
4. Any issues that arise relating to voting equipment shall be reported to the Secretary of State’s Office of Voting Systems Technology Assessment on Election Day, including a complete description of the problem and how it has been resolved. The Secretary of State will provide a telephone number for this purpose.
The Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail ( VVPAT) has been poorly implemented by the vendors on the DRE machines. These are sometimes separate printers attached to the machine. These should all be affixed and functioning. There are little doors that cover the paper printout for privacy when a voter with disabilities is using the equipment. Make sure that for non-disabled voters that this door is open. Make sure this is open and that pollworkers understand that voters are to review their VVPAT prior to casting their vote. It’s useful is highly dependent on its proper functioning and on voters actually verifying their votes.
Pollworkers
If you are going to be a pollworker, please sign up for the collaborative effort known as “Pollworkers for Democracy” at www.pollworkersfordemocracy.org. Included will be a conference call training and some materials to supplement what you learn at the county.
If you cannot become a pollworker, you can still observe everything that takes place inside your polling place while you are voting on Election Day.
State Election code 15004 allow the county central committee of each qualified political party to have present two specialists or engineers to be in attendance at any or all phase of the election.
Secretary of State News Release KS04:078 of November 1, 2004 has the best information on what the state allows pollwatchers to do (see page 44 for full press release):
Observers at polling places during the day are not allowed to film voters coming or leaving the voting site and may not film inside the polling place while the polls are open. There are exceptions, however, allowing for news media crews with consent of the county elections official.
Observers can be inside polling places, however, and may observe the roster of voters, watch the polling place being set up or closed at the end of the day, and they may see voting procedures throughout the day. They may not interfere with the work of the elections staff, nor may they touch any voting materials, station themselves near where voters are casting ballots or depositing their voted ballots, sit at the election board’s table, or intimidate or impede the actions of board members or voters.
1. Make no contact with any voter inside the polling place.
2. Wear no political gear or buttons, nor partisan insignias of any kind. Do not wear candidate buttons, candidate t-shirts or candidate hats. Don’t carry or distribute materials, which may have partisan or candidate information.
3. Remember that the election judge or poll worker is in charge, and can decide where you are permitted to sit or stand, and how many observers or poll monitors can be in the location at a time. They also may decide whether you can be permitted to come and go, or switch off with another poll monitor.
Here's what to look for with DRE machines if you are voting on one:
o Your vote shows up on the wrong choice
o You can't see the paper record of your vote (in states with a DRE voter verified paper trail, it may be hidden under a closed door or other obstruction)
o Confusing machine: Hard to figure out how to use it
o A candidate or question is missing from the screen
o The screen automatically fills in votes the voter doesn't want
o The screen fails to report that vote has been accepted. Usually it will say something like "vote cast" -- or the message can be more confusing, like "choices printed."
o Voting machines aren't running
o Error messages appear on the screen
o Administrative or technician screen appears instead of the ballot choices
o Voting machine crashes or freezes
o Voting machine screen is dim, has lines through it, colors are distorted or is otherwise hard to read.
o Voter card doesn't work
o (For accessible machines) The accessibility function aren't working (headphones, large text, keypads, sip n puff)
o Repairman is working on one of the voting machines
Here's what to look for with optical scan machines:
1. Repairman is working on one of the voting machines
2. Ballots are rejected, jam or ballot indicator doesn't advance after taking a ballot
3. Machine is replaced
4. Memory card is replaced on election day (before, during or after voting)
Verified Voting will have an online survey document and web form for end-of-day ballot accounting procedures. Anyone who wants to participate should sign up at
https://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=6390
INCIDENTS TO DOCUMENT
FOR ELECTION INCIDENT REPORTS (EIRS)
EQUIPMENT FAILURES
For all of the below be sure to note: Serial Numbers, Time of Day, and Precinct Location
Machine failure
Blank screen, fails to power up, freezes, delays opening of polls, other.
Include serial number, length of any delays, and how problem was handled.
Machine records voter preference incorrectly
Premarks choice, differs from paper trail printout, switches vote to another candidate on initial screen or in final summary screen - note the difference, voter cannot change vote displayed, calibration problems on touchscreens, other. Include serial#, and whether or not machine was taken out of service.
Voter access card problem
Times out, locks out voter, gets stuck or left in machine, other.
User interface issues
Screen has poor readability, flickering, dim, skipping, buttons stick, other.
Include serial number.
Language issues
Voter language not available, switches languages, translation problems, other.
Disabled access issues Wheelchair inaccessibility, audio, braille, or magnification inadequate or unusable, accessibility attachments don’t work, machine gives person unable to use hands no means to vote, other. Include serial number.
Security issues
Machines stored in unlocked location, memory cards not secured, machine connected to telephone line or wire during Election Day, machine uses wireless connection, seals broken or missing, other. Include serial number if possible.
Paper trail issues Printer jams, prints over previous entries, not visible, differs from vote, other. Include serial number.
Ballot display issues on touchscreens
One or more candidates or questions are missing from the ballot displayed, incorrect ballot is displayed, other. Include serial number.
Ballot issues on optiscans
Ballot is already marked, scanner rejects ballot though ballot is in good order; scanner mangles ballot, other. Include serial number.
Touchscreen fails to report that vote has been accepted
Error messages appear on the touchscreen
Machine has incorrect time of day
Technicians, repairpersons working on one of the voting machines
BBV suggests…
• Note the name of any "rovers" or technicians who visit during the day. Whether the procedures dictate this or not, request to see the identification of any technicians or rovers, even if they are just asking questions rather than servicing the equipment. (In 2004, fake technicians showed up in one Washington state jurisdiction; poll workers obtained the license plate numbers and phone numbers of each and submitted it to the elections office, where the information was retrieved by Black Box Voting.
Memory cards are replaced on Election Day (before, during or after voting)
Machine does not print precinct results
Power outages
Most machines have battery backup. Note how long the batteries operate before the machine shuts off.
PROCEDURAL FAILURES
Provisional ballot issues
Failure to offer provisional ballot to any voter not on voter lists, mishandling of provisional ballots, other.
Emergency paper ballot issues
In touchscreen precincts, emergency paper ballots not on hand in case of equipment breakdown, other.
Results tapes
You should be allowed to see the polling place results tapes at the precinct for the end of day precinct results. Note if you are not allowed.
VVPAT
Pollworkers understand VVPATs, urge voters to review their VVPATs, explain VVPATs and purpose of them. Make sure the VVPAT is visible to the voters.
Credits: Pollworkers for Democracy
.
General public
State Election code 15004 allow the county central committee of each qualified political party to have present two specialists or engineers to be in attendance at any or all phase of the election.
Secretary of State News Release KS04:078 of November 1, 2004 has the best information on what the state allows pollwatchers to do (see page 44 for full press release):
Observers at polling places during the day are not allowed to film voters coming or leaving the voting site and may not film inside the polling place while the polls are open. There are exceptions, however, allowing for news media crews with consent of the county elections official.
Observers can be inside polling places, however, and may observe the roster of voters, watch the polling place being set up or closed at the end of the day, and they may see voting procedures throughout the day. They may not interfere with the work of the elections staff, nor may they touch any voting materials, station themselves near where voters are casting ballots or depositing their voted ballots, sit at the election board’s table, or intimidate or impede the actions of board members or voters.
At the close of the polls, the results are to be posted on the outside of the polling place. Although this is CA law, some of the voting machines have been state certified even though they can’t print this out. An extra printer is required for each polling place for the Sequoia DREs to print out their results. Not every RoV has invested in this printer and the plans for how to comply with the law vary from asking the SoS to waive the requirement to asking pollworkers to hand copy down the results and post them.
These results are important. They show the results that are on the memory cards PRIOR to any transfer of the cards to other people in other places. Every transfer has a potential for the card to be tampered with or swapped out for a planted malicious alternate by a malicious pollworker. Thus, getting the results from the polling place is key.
One method to observe this final vote is to go around to every polling place and write down the numbers and/or take a digital picture of the results. There are pros and cons to this. While you will get the most accurate, unadulterated information, the chances of getting all the information is slim. Once these tapes are pasted anyone can just pull them off the doors. An option to avoid this is to organize a “last voter” group. This person waits to place the last vote at the polling place and then waits for the results to be posted so they can be recorded. If there are not enough people to be the last voter, people would have to be organized to go to multiple polling places and copy down the results.
Another option is that AFTER the election is to do a Public Records Request and ask for these polling place results tapes. Make sure to specify you want the original, otherwise they may generate a new tape because they had the memory cards may be close at hand, but the original tapes may be in an offsite location like a warehouse.
Each tape is supposed to be signed by four precinct workers, so it would be difficult, but not impossible, to manipulate. Seeing the original and asking for a copy would add some assurance that you are really getting the results from that polling place. The problem with this method is that it is expensive and time consuming. You don’t get answers election night to check up on any manipulation. The Public Records Request law is that they have 10 days to acknowledge that you asked for information. There is no time limit on when they provide the information. It could be after the election is certified, and then you are out of luck.
Verified Voting will have an online survey document and web form for poll closing and ballot accounting procedures. Anyone who wants to participate should sign up at
https://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=6390
See page 45 for relevant election codes.
General public
State Election code 15004 allow the county central committee of each qualified political party to have present two specialists or engineers to be in attendance at any or all phase of the election.
The following has been taken from the Blackboxvoting Toolkit
Goals: See if you can map out where each of the key parts of the voting system are during the life cycle of the election. Identify who has access at each point and what records are kept.
Chain of custody applies to:
o Ballots
o Voting machines
o Memory cards
o Voting system peripherals, like voter cards and voter authentication devices
o Election data (the path of the votes from the time they are cast until they are counted and printed)
Before the election: Ask questions and do public records requests. Here are some good things to find out:
o Where is each key element of the election manufactured?
o Who had custody when transporting it to your jurisdiction?
o Who had access before it was stored?
o Where was it stored and who had access to its storage and how was this recorded?
o Who pulled it out of storage, and when, and was the public allowed to watch and document?
o What accounting is there for purchases of ballots, memory cards, voting system peripherals, voting machines and computers?
o What contractors have had access to parts of the system?
o Forget about who has permission to access, who has keys? How are keys and access logged? Are there video cameras?
o What company prints the ballots? Are there overages? Are the extra ballots at the printing house ever accounted for? Who has access to them?
o Who mails the absentee ballots?
o When absentee ballots are mailed back in, does the U.S. Post Office keep a count of those received? Where is the paperwork on that?
o Where do the mailed-in absentee ballots go after the post office? Directly to the elections office or to a middleman?
o What is the chain of custody at each stage of absentee ballot processing?
o Is any voting equipment (or supplies) sent home for sleepovers with poll workers?
o What transportation companies are in charge of delivering items to the polling place? From the polling place?
Special chain of custody events to watch:
o Preparing voting machines for election and/or testing: Go to the warehouse and watch as they pull them off the shelves and put memory cards into them. Watch what's going on with the memory cards/cartridges and the machines.
o Who are the people who are handling the machines and cards? Permanent employees? Temps? Have they been background-checked?
During the election:
o Are any memory cards or voting machines swapped during the election?
o Did technicians work on voting machines during the election?
After the polls close
o Are the machine precinct counts posted at the polling place before putting them into the central counting machine?
o On Election night, observe the handling of the ballots boxes (memory cards / cartridges). Could they be swapped? Watch to see if political party operatives or vendors ever handle them.
o In many jurisdictions, election supplies and ballot boxes (memory cards / cartridges) are taken to a drop-off point, called by various names. You will find that almost no one watches what happens at the drop-off centers. Get a list of the drop-off sites and go observe on election night. Can you track chain of custody for memory cards, supplies, machines, and peripherals? (Here is a videotape taken at a drop-off point. Could you spot a memory card swap here? http://www.bbvdocs.org/videos/inthedark.mpg )
o Yellow cabs, political observers or truck drivers transporting ballot boxes (memory cards / cartridges) from the polling place to the elections division on election night
o Are observers allowed to see all of the rooms where ballot box (memory card, cartridge) processing is taking place?
o Are observers allowed to watch check-in of cartridges; memory cards?
o Did technicians work on the central tabulator during the vote count?
o Were there any problems with modems or data transmission on election night?